Why distinguish quasi subjects fron quasi objects?

Quasi objects vs Quasi subjects seems to be something quite important in AIME. It is an axis that splits the first three modes from all the others and organizes at least nine modes in triads.

1. Yet with all this attention to symmetries one may ask: Why do we distinguish quasi subjects from quasi objects? Why have three modes that form quasi- subjects and three modes that form quasi-objects and not  six modes forming quasi-whatevers?

pg 428

"What is an object? The set of quasi subjects that are attached to it. What is a subject? The set of quasi objects that are attached to it."

pg425

"There is no better definition of any existent whatsoever beyond this list of the other beings through which it must, it can, it seeks to pass."

2. But I also read

pg 372

"This is what semiotics identified so clearly with its theory of enunciation. This is what allowed us never to begin our analysis with acting, thinking, speaking human beings, humans capable of “creating technologies,” “imagining works,” or “producing objective knowledge.” To put it in the shorthand terms of anthropogenesis: humanoids became humans—thinking, speaking humans—by dint of association with the beings of technology, fiction, and reference. They became skillful, imaginative, capable of objective knowledge, by dint of grappling with these modes of existence. This is why we have reused the expression “quasi objects” to designate both the advent of these beings (they are truly objects) and the still-empty place of the subjects that might come later (they are only quasi  objects)."

and

"Now, the three modes grouped together here are distinguished by the fact that they come to fill, as it were, the still-empty form of the implicit enunciator. They are not subjects (we know that the subject has been unmoored; we arrive at the subject without starting from the subject), but these beings are nevertheless offers of subjectivity, of critical importance for the definition of our anthropology. They are thus in fact quasi subjects. To sum up the originality of this third group in an overhasty sentence, let us say that, while following along the political Circle, humans become capable of opining and of articulating positions in a collective—they become free and autonomous citizens; by being attached to the forms of law, they become capable of continuity in time and space—they become assured, attributable selves responsible for their acts; by receiving the religious Word, they become capable of salvation and perdition—they are now persons, recognized, loved, and sometimes saved."

So what am I to make of it. Two things:
a) First there is a kind of arrow of the course of action. It probably has to do with what is called in AIME "the presence of a plane of enounciation" which distinguishes a source and a target. In the case of quasi-objects, the modes concentrate on communities that are realized on the target side: the community of works of art with their elaborate relations, the community of technological objects with their elaborate relations, the community of "objective entities" with their elaborate relations. In the case of quasi-subjects, the modes concentrate on communities in the source side of the motion: the community of believers, the community of politically active people, the community of legal persons

b) this situation strongly reminds me of the notion of duality in mathematics. (once more category theory as a training camp for philosophy! )

Now one may ask : There are courses of action in the case of [REP], [HAB], [MET]. How come there is no distinction for them and then suddenly this crucial distinction comes into existence? (Crucial also for [ATT], [MOR], [ORG])
I have no clue. Perhaps the idea that  quasi-subjects and quasi-objects do not exist for the first three modes is wrong. (What kind of trial determines wether what I say here is true or not? Discussion by a community, isn't it so? )